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A Proposal for Regulating Hate Speech in the
United States: Balancing Rights Under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note seeks a better approach to regulating hate speech
in the United States-an approach comporting with our notions of
freedom of speech under the First Amendment, but also drawing
inspiration from the international approach, which protects the
rights and needs of the listener in free speech 'controversies. By
comparing the United States Supreme Court's approach to speech
with the international approach exemplified in the United Nations
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"),' I
hope to synthesize the best of both approaches into a workable
exception to our broad freedom of speech, an exception promot-
ing antidiscrimination principles and specifically recognizing the
harm to the victim.
To this end, Part II describes the conflict between free speech
and hate speech prohibitions, and demonstrates the need for
reconciliation of the opposing views. It includes a description of
the confusion and inconsistency in this area today, which not only
calls for a solution, but shows that the search for a workable solu-
tion is still taking place, even in the Supreme Court. Part III de-
scribes the current broad interpretation of the First Amendment
with respect to hate speech, especially as demonstrated in R.A.V. v.
St. Paul.2 Part IV defines the international approach and how the
United States has failed to apply it. Part IV also demonstrates how
and why the ICCPR can be used to refocus our approach to hate
speech. Part V synifhesizes the United States and international
1 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR], reprinted in MARc J. Bossuyr, GUIDE TO THE "TRAUVAUX
PREPARATOIRES" OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1987).
The ICCPR entered into force internationally on March 23, 1976; the Senate gave its
advice and consent on April 2. 1992; the United States deposited its instrument of ratifi-
cation with the United Nations [hereinafter U.N.] on June 8, 1992; and the ICCPR en-
tered into force for the United States on September 8, 1992. See David P. Stewart, U.S.
Ratifcation of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations,
Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77, 77 (1993).
2 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
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approaches into a workable alternative solution by providing a set
of factors that should be balanced against each other when regu-
lating hate speech.
II. THE PROBLEM
A. The Two Sides of the Problem-Free Speech v. Hate Speech
Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech . .. .
Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that consti-
tutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be
prohibited by law.'
The first quoted statement, the First Amendment free speech
clause, has been extended by the United States Supreme Court5
to protect hate speech.' The second statement demonstrates the
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20(2), reprinted in BOSSUYT, at 403.
5 The United States Supreme Court can "extend" the meaning and application of
constitutional provisiotis because it is the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. This
idea was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Court is also the final reviewing authority for all state acts un-
der the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the U.S. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
6 "Hate speech" is generally defined in words similar to those used in Article 20 of
the ICCPR---speech "advocating" or "inciting" acts of discrimination or violence towards a
group of people or an individual based on hatred for their nationality, race, religion, or
any other immutable characteristic. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20, reprinted in Bossuyr,
at 403; see also International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, Dec. 21, 1965, art. 4, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. "Hatred is an active dislike, a feeling
of antipathy or enmity connected with a disposition to injure." Karl J. Partsch, Racial
Speech and Human Rights: Article 4 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, in STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND NON-
DISCRIMINATION 21, 22 (Sandra Coliver ed., 1992).
Hate "speech" includes expressive conduct like crossburning. Nonverbal speech was
first recognized as "speech" in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). While there
are various nuances in the differing treatments of speech and conduct in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, this Note utilizes a generalized free speech notion that assumes simi-
lar protection for all types of expression. Therefore, throughout this Note, "speech,"
"expression," "expressive conduct," and "advocacy" are used interchangeably. First Amend-
ment speech protection is applicable not only to Congress, but also to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
It is difficult to define hate speech categorically and rigidly because it necessarily
depends on the circumstances, and on the reactions and intentions of the parties in-
volved. For example, "A black family enters a coffee shop in a small ... town. A white
man places a card on their table. The card reads, 'You have just been paid a visit by the
Ku Klux Klan.'" Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
Stoy, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2320 (1989) (footnote omitted). As another example: "A
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general international approach to hate speech-the prohibition of
hate speech by law. At first glance, our First Amendment jurispru-
dence and the ICCPR do not seem compatible.7
However, the international approach and hate speech legisla-
tion should not be dismissed as inconsistent with the First Amend-
ment.' The Supreme Court can directly address the negative ef-
law student goes to her dorm and finds an anonymous message posted on the door, a
caricature image of her race, with a red line slashed through it." Id. These examples
depict the kinds of situations in which hate speech regulations will be relevant. However,
even these scenarios may not categorically and definitely represent hate speech, especially
as the "speaker" is using his freedom of speech. See infra Parts II.B. and III.D.1 (describ-
ing various considerations for hate speech regulation).
In addition, hate speech and its broad consequences seem to cross the boundaries
of traditional speech categories-political, scientific, libel, fighting words, incitement to
crime or violence. Thus, a closely defined hate speech category would overlap and fur-
ther confuse these other various categories. Perhaps such confusion is the reason for the
courts' current inability to effectively define and address hate speech. As Justice Harlan
stated: "Every communication has an individuality and 'value' of its own . ... [I]n the
nature of things every . . . -suppression raises an individual constitutional problem, in
which a reviewing court must determine for itsefwhether the attacked expression is sup-
pressible . . . ." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497 (1957)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
This distaste for categorically defining speech also surfaces in the Canadian approach to
speech controversies. See infra Part V. At any rate, I will define hate speech through the
case-by-case balancing test developed in Parts IV and V.
7 The cases and statutes under which this conflict in approaches and terms would
become relevant, and possibly dispositive, include hate speech ordinance challenges under
the Constitution, such as RA.V., or enforcement challenges under Civil Rights Statutes.
such as 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988).
8 While some Supreme Court Justices have advocated a strict, absolutist view of free
speech-notably Justices Black and Douglas (see, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Califor-
nia, 366 U.S. 36 (1961))-most do not fully subscribe to it; rather, most Justices would
generally leave open narrow exceptions under which freedom of speech can be balanced
away to accommodate some higher right or need. Justice Harlan. for example, is also
noted for the balancing approach he expounded in Konigsberg. See JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIoNAL LAW 942-44 (4th ed. 1991).
However, freedom of speech does occupy a heavily '"preferred position." See
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). "[T]he United States affords more le-
gal protection than is even conceivable in most (and probably all) other democratic
countries." Floyd Abrams, Hate Speech: the Present Impli6ations of a Historical Dilemma, 37
VLL. L" REv. 743, 743 (1992). While not providing absolute protection to all speech in
every given situation, the Court has protected a broad range of expression, including
some speech that is often arguably detrimental to the common good of society. See, e.g.,
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (protecting crossburning); United States v.
Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (protecting flag burning as expressive conduct); Florida
Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (protecting a newspaper publishing the name of a
rape victim); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (protecting libelous news
articles about a private citizen by expanding New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to include
anyone of special prominence in the community); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518
(1972) (protecting a defendant's speech addressing a policeman, "you son of a bitch I'll
choke you to death"); Cohen v. California,- 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting the wearing of
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fects of hate speech by expanding its First Amendment jurispru-
dence to include the international approach. International juris-
prudence provides strong, but less absolutist, protection of speech,
especially when the rights of others in the community conflict with
that protection.9 The question is whether the First Amendment
requires protection of hate speech under the broader protection
of free speech. ° Can we realize a need to eradicate hate speech
without infringing on "valid" free speech?
B. Confusion and Opposition
Under recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the ICCPR ap-
proach would seemingly die a stillborn death." Protection of rac-
ist hate speech, though, is hard to explain to humane and sensi-
tive citizens, especially in light of ongoing racial problems in the
United States and the various efforts made towards correcting
them.
12
Allowing hate speech is similarly incongruous with the United
a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969) (protecting KKK members' speech advocating political reform through
violence and teaching criminal syndicalism); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254 (1964) (protecting libelous newspaper articles about government officials as free
speech, unless the high standard of "actual malice" is met); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949) (protecting speech denouncing Jews and blacks by striking down an ordi-
nance that prohibited breaches of the peace).
9 Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), provided for similar
community interests:
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication . . . may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute,
but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order: but it must not, in
the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16.
10 Hate speech is not necessarily limited to racism. The ICCPR also speaks of na-
tional origin and religion, which could be expanded to include all hate-based speech,
such as hate speech addressed to gender or sexual preference. This Note focuses on rac-
ist hate speech as the most prominent and exemplary type of hate speech. Because
"[racism . . . comprises [consciously and unconsciously] . . . the mechanisms for keep-
ing selected victim groups in subordinated positions," it serves as a model for how hate
expression affects all targeted individuals and groups. Matsuda, supra note 6. at 2332
(footnote omitted).
11 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992); see also infra Part III.D.
12 Such corrective efforts have been taken by state legislatures and by universities
and colleges around the United States. See Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules:
Constitutional Narratives in Collision, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 284, 286 n.2;
Ronna Greff Schneider, Hate Speech in the United States: Recent Legal Developments, in STRIK-
ING A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 269, 269-76.
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States ratification of the ICCPR. As a member of the United Na-
tions, the United States has agreed to promote "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language, and reli-
gion.""3 By ratifying the ICCPR, the United States has agreed to
follow the covenant's substantive ideals and underlying precepts. 4
The preamble to the ICCPR, for example, states that:
[I]n accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter
of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and
of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the hu-
man family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world .... these rights derive from the inherent dignity of
the human person .... [and] the ideal of free human beings
enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and
want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his
economic, social and cultural rights .... 15
These ideals depict a broader view of the importance and effects
of speech; they take into account the rights of the listener as well
as those of the speaker." This approach recognizes that living in
community requires a certain level of consideration for others, as
any one person's actions necessarily affect his neighbors.
The international approach is especially important with re-
spect to racism and discrimination. All forms of discrimination,
including racial, ethnic, religious and sexual, remain prevalent and
painful today. 7 Hate speech requires special attention because its
13 U.N. CHARTER art. 55(c).
14 See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2, reprinted in BOSSUYr, at 49. See generally Oscar M.
Garibaldi, Obligations Arising from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Optional Protocol, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTs ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 54 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993) [hereinafter U.S. RATIFICATION].
The "underlying precepts" of the ICCPR include anti-discrimination, equality, and
human dignity. See infra Part IV.A (describing these principles in more detail).
15 ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl., reprinted in BOSSuyr, at 1. See generally BOSSL'rT, supra
note 1 (presenting the debates and notes of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
from the drafting of the ICCPR). These ,ideals are reiterated throughout the ICCPR. For
example, Article 19(3)(a) speaks of "respect for the rights or reputations of others."
16 See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RAcISM AND AMERICAN LAW 515 (3rd ed. 1992). This, of
course, depends on the existence of the listener's rights, and the recognition of the va-
lidity and worth of those rights. See infra Parts III.D. and IV (demonstrating that listener's
rights do have validity and worth that demand full recognition). This contrasts with the
current United States view that only the rights of the speaker need be considered in
depth. See infra Parts III.A-C. (discussing United States approach, especially in light of
R.A.V.).
17 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 16, at 519 nn.9-11. See also, Matsuda, supra note 6, at
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effects are deep and destructive on both individual" and societal
levels. 9 As Justice Robert H. Jackson wrote: "These epithets come
down to our generation weighted with hatreds accumulated
through centuries of bloodshed .... They are always, and in
every context, insults which do not spring from reason and can be
answered by none."" Hate speech directed at minorities carries
with it past degradations and deprivations to such an extent that it
cannot but conjure up those images again. The enforced "inferior-
ity" of the past is brought into the present and made to live
again." A noose hung over the desk of a black worker accompa-
nied by "KKK" references vividly demonstrates this effect.2
In hate speech situations, the weight of majority power often
2320 (providing hate speech examples and further support for the fact that- racism is still
common today).
18 Professor Matsuda describes the destructive and inevitable effects of hate speech
and racism:
[Alt some level, no matter how much both victims and well-meaning dominant
group members resist it, racial inferiority is planted in our minds as an idea
that may hold some truth. The idea is improbable and abhorrent, but it is there
before us, because it is presented repeatedly . . . . We stifle it, reject it as
wrong, but it is there, interfering with our perception and interaction with the
person next to us. For the victim, similarly, the angry rejection of the message
of inferiority is coupled with absorption of the message . . . . From the victim's
perspective racist hate messages cause real damage.
See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2320, 2339-40 (footnotes omitted). .
In addition, hate propaganda has a causal effect on hate-related violence against
target groups. As the most horrific example of this causal connection, Hitler "murdered
six million Jews in the culmination of a campaign that had as a major theme the idea of
racial superiority. . . . [Tihe knowledge that anti-Semitic hate propaganda and the rise
of Nazism were clearly connected guided development of the emerging international law
on incitement to racial hatred." Id. at 2342. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornogra-
phy, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Mackinnon,
Pornography] (describing a similar causal link between pornography and sexual violence).
My argument throughout this Note as to the need to refocus our approach to hate
speech closely parallels much of Professor MacKinnon's ideas on harm-based analysis.
connections between propaganda and societal problems, and equalitarian and dignitarian
concepts, as developed in that article. See also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS
(1993) [hereinafter MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS] (developing these concepts and, especially,
the equalitarian approach to speech).
19 See infra Part III.D.1. See generally, BELL, supra note 16, at 514-28; Delgado, supra
note 12, at 292-94; Charles R. Lawrence, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence:
Antisubordination Theory and the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787, 791-95, 800-04
(1992).
20 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 299 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Hate
speech, as used in this Note, refers to broader expression than just epithets. Justice
Jackson's statement rings true for much of this broader hate speech as well.
21 See Lawrence, supra note 19, at 792-94, 800.
22 See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2327 (providing various discrimination examples,
including this race-based hate expression).
[Vol. 69:4
NOTE-PROPOSAL FOR REGULATING HATE SPEECH
seems to rest on only a politically weak few; the physical and psy-
chological power of being in the majority plays on the inferior
feelings of the excluded target group.2 Additionally, there is rare-
ly any reply to the hate speaker. "[R]acist invectives are one-sided;
they neither invite nor permit response .... Hate speech silences
its victim and mars his or her response as presumptively un-
equal."24 Thus, by its psychosocial weight and the impossibility of
effective response, hate speech in a racial context can function as
a means of "maintaining established systems of caste and subordi-
nation." ' Limiting hate speech and its effects on society is one
step towards healing the historical wounds of racism and closing
the rifts between races today.26
However, this step is not an easy one under current First
Amendment jurisprudence. In RA.V v. St. Pau4 the Supreme
Court found that free speech protection includes the burning of a
cross on the lawn of a black family in the middle of the night.
27
The ICCPR also recognizes the importance of free speech: "Every-
one shall have the right to freedom of expression."28 However, in
its approach to hate speech, the ICCPR considers the victim's per-
spective, including the view that protection of hate-based activities
such as crossburning is misplaced.29 Without such consideration,
how can members of a targeted minority group be fully enfran-
chised citizens-with the mutual respect of the majority and the
laws-under decisions such as RA.V?
A minority group can only feel left out, their feelings and
right to equal treatment and protection of the laws and the courts
of this country ignored."0 In light of Congress' recent ratification
23 As Professor Bell states: "Protection of racism and its expression in racial invec-
tives has favored the powerful against the powerless." BELL, supra note 16, at 525-26.
24 Id. at 526. Again, racist hate speech functions as a model for ethnic, religious,
and sexual discrimination. The silencing and subordination of the victims has a similar
dynamic in each case.
25 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 792; see also Bell, supra note 16, at 522-23.
26 As Professor Bell writes: "To provide redress for persons of color and other ex-
cluded groups is not to open the floodgates of censorship but to identify a specific
group uniquely vulnerable to majoritarian oppression in need of government intervention
simply to balance the scales." BELL, supra note 16, at 526.
27 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2540-41, 2550 (1992). See infra Part III.C. for a full discussion of
R.A.V For more examples of hate-speech confrontations and situations, see Matsuda,
supra note 6, at 2320, 2326-31, 2361-72.
28 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19(2), reprinted in BossTYr, at 381.
29 See generally Matsuda, supra note 6 (describing hate speech from the victim-
listeners' point of view).
30 See BELL, supra note 16, at 522-23.
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of the ICCPR, hope for a better balancing of speakers' and
listeners' rights lies in the international approach's inclusion of
the victim-listener in its analysis of free expression." The Su-
preme Court's conflicting opinions in hate speech cases, and the
apparent distaste expressed by the individual Justices in protecting
hate speakers, may provide the window through which a new ap-
proach can be brought to the light. The Supreme Court needs a
workable alternative, which can only be developed by criiically
examining current First Amendment speech jurisprudence.
III. THE UNITED STATES APPROACH
A. Historical Background
The Supreme Court considers freedom of speech, as provided
in the First Amendment, 32 to be one of our most sacred rights as
citizens. According to Justice Cardozo, free speech is "the matrix,
the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of free-
dom."'3  However, the First Amendment's brevity has presented
many jurisprudential problems of interpretation, giving rise to
many free speech controversies.' Justice Holmes noted why free
speech disagreements are often controversial: "[I]t is . . . not free
thought for those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought
that we hate," 5 which provides the most enduring value of free
speech theory.
Interpretation of the scope of freedom of speech has been
complicated by the lack of legislative history and the absence of
any clear statement of the Framers' intent in writing the First
Amendment.36 The several theories advanced for justifying free
speech protection 37 include: public enlightenment through open
31 Does not ratification of the ICCPR at least marginally evidence an intent on the
part of the United States to change its approach to hate speech to reflect more of the
ratified document? See infra Part IV. Even with the reservations and limits placed on the
ICCPR by the United States, the international approach should influence our system, at
least doctrinally. For a full discussion of what constitutes a "listeners' right," see infra Part
III.D.
32 "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
33 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
34 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 937-38. See also infra Part III.B.
35 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
36 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 937.
37 The First Amendment does not prohibit the abridging of speech, but rather free-
dor of speech. "Therefore, the values perceived in a system of free expression will be
determinative of whether there exists an inhibition upon that freedom." NOWAK & RO-
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debate;"8 truth-searching by espousing ideas in the open "market-
place" of competing ideas; 9 participation in self-government;4"
individual self-fulfillment;4' provision of a safety valve for citizen
outburst;42 and checking the abuses of the government.43 These
theories provide the impetus and justification for the "absolutist
approach to rights and preoccupation with individual rights,"
4 '
including freedom of speech.
However, freedom of speech has been limited for certain
theoretical and practical reasons. From the beginning, "[c]olonial
America was an open society dotted with closed enclaves, and one
TUNDA, supra note 8, at 939-40.
38 This theory was most notably propounded by John Milton and John Stuart Mill.
Milton wrote: "[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth,
so truth be in the field, we do injuriously, by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her
strength. Let her and falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worse in a free
and open encounter?" JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITIQ,, A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLI-
CENSED PRINTING TO THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
Mill added recognition of public enlightenment as a positive good resulting from
the free exchange of ideas. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY ch. 11 (1859).
39 Closely related to the previous theory, this "marketplace of ideas" theory was ad-
vanced by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, and is arguably the most prominent of the
free-speech theories. Justice Holmes wrote: "[W]hen men have realized that time has
upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe . . . that the ultimate good desired
is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... " Abrams v. United
States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
40 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 8-
11 (1966). Emerson states: "[T]he right of all members of society to form their own
beliefs and communicate them freely to others must be regarded as an essential principle
of a democratically organized society." Id. at 9.
41 See id. at 4-7. Emerson writes:
[Man] has powers to reason and to feel in ways that are unique in degree if
not in kind . . . . It is through development of these powers that man finds his
meaning and his place in the world . . . .Every man is influenced by the his
fellows . . . .but his mind is his own and its functioning is necessarily an indi-
vidual affair ... From this it follows that every man . . has the right to
form his own beliefs and opinions. And it also follows that he has the right to
express these beliefs and opinions.
Id. at 4-5.
42 Justice Brandeis espoused this theory in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357
(1927), when he stated "that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagina-
tion; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable
government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies . . . ." Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
43 "[O]nce we allow the government any power to restrict the freedom of speech.
we may have taken a one-way path that is a slippery slope." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 8, at 940-41.
44 Elizabeth F. Defeis, Freedom of Speech and International Norms: A Response to Hate
Speech, 29 STAN. J. INT'L L. 57, 62 (1992).
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could generally settle with his co-believers in safety and comfort
and exercise the right of oppression." 5  Living in community,
then as now, defines the norm of human existence and requires a
certain consensus to follow the community's rules for the mutual
benefit of all of its members. 6 Government use of such consent
to justify controlling actions and speech divergent from that which
the ruling authority values prompted the Framers of the Bill of
Rights to subject "individual autonomy only to limited government
for limited purposes."47 Thus, the First Amendment advances free-
dom of speech by restricting the government's ability to abuse
individual rights.4"
B. The General Rule and the Exceptions
First Amendment freedom of speech generally enjoys a "pre-
ferred position"49 in the constellation of constitutional rights. In
any context where the laws or actions of the government infringe
upon the freedom of speech of its citizens, this preferential treat-
ment draws its power from the application of the various tools of
judicial review. For instance, "the Court has applied a narrowed
presumption of constitutionality, strictly construed statutes to avoid
limiting first amendment freedoms, restricted prior restraint and
subsequent punishment, relaxed general requirements of standing
to sue and generally set higher standards of procedural due pro-
cess . . . ."50 The courts conscientiously protect freedom of
speech by requiring that speech regulations not be overly broad,
too vague, or discriminatory towards content or viewpoint.5
45 JOHN P. ROCHE, American Liberty: An Examination of the "Tradition" of Freedom, in
SHADOW AND SUBSTANCE: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND STRUCTURE OF POLITICS 11 (1964).
46 See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 40, at 78.
47 Defeis, supra note 44, at 62; see also LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1010 (2d ed. 1988) (describing consent theory and effects in government and law).
48 See Defeis, supra note 44, at 62.
49 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (delineating preferred position
and importance of free speech protection).
50 NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 838.
51 See generally id. § 16. This general exposition of free speech protection in the
courts demonstrates the level of preference for free speech and the narrow limits within
which speech regulation, at least in the "public forum," will be allowed. The Court will
not tolerate speech limitations that are based on the subjects or viewpoints expressed,
especially when it is political expression. See MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at
38-40, 83 (describing and criticizing arguments for absolutist protection of political
speech). This Note generally is concerned with limitations on speech in the public fo-
rum, where speech is most highly protected, and where most hate speech occurs. In the
"nonpublic forum," content regulation is allowed and hate speech can be more easily
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The preference for freedom of speech, however, does not rise
to the level of an absolute standard. "Even the absolutist approach
to the First Amendment has been tempered by the recognition of
certain categories of speech of lesser societal value which the state
can regulate."52 Speech such as libel and slander," obscenity,
54
incitement to criminal action,55  and "fighting words"" has been
found to be "lesser value" speech, or not to be speech at all, such
that limiting it-even based on content-does not conflict with
First Amendment free speech. 7 The Court has employed a lesser
standard of protection for commercial speech" and, additionally,
has allowed narrowly tailored speech regulations where the state
has a compelling interest in regulating the speech. 9 Thus, there
regulated, as long as the regulation is viewpoint-neutral. See Perry Educational Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at
1082-92.
52 Defeis, supra note 44, at 63.
53 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (protecting private indi-
viduals from libel by requiring only negligence in thb publication of libelous material);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964) (protecting the press to some ex-
tent through the "aciual malice" standard, but still presenting libel of public officials as
less protected speech); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (holding libel to be
"unprotected" speech).
54 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (defining proscribable obscen-
ity as that which the "average person" would find to appeal to the "prurient interest" in
offensively depicting sexual conduct without "literary, artistic, political, or scientific val-
ue").
55 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (stating
that advocacy "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and ... likely
to incite or produce such action" constitutes less protected speech subject to proscrip-
tion) (foomote omitted); see also Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (applying strictly
the Brandenburg test for advocacy of violence or lawlessness).
56 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (finding no
communicative value in "epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby causing a breach of the peace").
57 "There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech[, including
obscenity, libel, fighting words, and incitement to violence], the prevention and punish-
ment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem . . . .
[S]uch utterances are no essential part of any exposition of.ideas, and ...any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Id. at 571-72.
Of course, the majority in R.A.V held that content discrimination is improper even
in the case of "unprotected speech." See infra Part III.C (appraising RA.V.'s effect on free
speech jurisprudence).
58 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993) (adding
the "reasonable fit" standard of defining the relationship between the legitimate govern-
ment interest in commercial speech regulation and the means chosen); Central'Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (giving "lesser pro-
tection" to commercial speech).
59 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("[T]he govern-
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are some limits on the preference for and protection of free
speech.
Is the need for restricting commercial speech greater or more
valid than that for restricting hate speech? Is hate speech not as
objectionable, valueless, and unworthy of protection as obscenity
or slander?
C. Hate Speech Regulation in the United States
1. Current Atmosphere
Recently, communities throughout the United States have
attempted to regulate and limit hate speech.' Although this has
taken various forms,61 statutory attempts at hate speech regulation
fall into two general categories.62 First, the Supreme Court has
held those statutes which enhance the penalty for bias-motivated
offenses to be constitutional." Second, some statutes seek to ex-
plicitly create an independent crime for hate-related speech and
conduct.64 The constitutional validity of this second category of
hate speech regulation has not been clearly settled. All of the
challenges to speech regulation and the judicial review procedures
which make free speech a "preferred right"' have been brought
to bear on this type of direct hate speech regulation. This is best
demonstrated in R.A.V. v. St. Paul,' the Court's seminal hate
speech case.
ment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected
speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the
regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental in-
terest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the
information'") (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)); see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 1087.
60 See Daniel D. Munster, Comment, RA.V. v. St. Paul: The Future of Hate Speech
Regulation, 70 U. DET. L. REV. 347, 361 (1993); see also Delgado, supra note 12, at 284
(describing several college campus hate speech regulations); Schneider, supra note 12, at
269, 270-71 & n.10 (specifying various states and communities that have attempted hate
speech legislation).
61 See Schneider, supra note 12, at 270-71 (listing attempted hate speech regulations).
62 See Munster, supra note 60, at 361.
63 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (holding that increasing penalty
for racially motivated attack does not violate First Amendment because it is conduct regu-
lation and judges traditionally have considered motive as a factor in sentencing).
64 See Munster, supra note 60, at 363; see Schneider, supra note 12, at 270-71.
65 See supra Part III.B (discussing preferred position and importance of free speech).
66 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). The majority in R.A.V. ultimately departs, however, from
the traditional categorical analysis of free speech protection. See infra Part III.C.2 (describ-
ing majority's "underinclusiveness" doctrine which alters previous free speech analysis).
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2. R.A.V. v. St. Paul
In 1990, St. Paul, Minnesota enacted an ordinance creating a
separate criminal misdemeanor for hate speech, or at least for
symbolic conduct of a hateful nature." The St. Paul Bias-Motivat-
ed Crime Ordinance provided:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including but not limit-
ed to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or
has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resent-
ment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.'
In R.A.V v. St. Paul, R.A.V. was charged under this ordinance for
burning a cross in the middle of the night on the lawn of a black
family, 69 a seemingly clear example of the type of hate expression
that St. Paul was trying to combat. The Minnesota Supreme Court
found the ordinance applicable and constitutional.7"
R.A.V. did fiot contest the application of the St. Paul Bias-
Motivated Crime Ordinance to his actions, but rather challenged
its constitutionality. He argued that "the St. Paul bias-motivated
disorderly conduct ordinance potentially censors so many consti-
tutionally protected activities on its face that it must be completely
invalidated." The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected this chal-
lenge, stating:
Although the St. Paul ordinance should have been more care-
fully drafted, it can be interpreted so as to reach only those
expressions of hatred and resorts to bias-motivated personal
abuse that the first amendment does not protect. So interpret-
ed, the ordinance is a narrowly tailored means toward accom-
plishing the compelling governmental interest in protecting the
community against bias-motivated threats to public safety and
order, and therefore is not prohibited by the first amend-
ment.72
The Supreme Court applied the doctrinal exception to free
67 St. Paul, Minn. Leg. Code § 292.02 (1990).
68 Id.
69 112 S. Ct. at 2540.
70 See In re R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 509, 511 (Minn. 1991).
71 Id. at 509.
72 Id. at 511.
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speech established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire?3 to narrow the
scope of the St. Paul ordinance to cover only unprotected "fight-
ing words."74 Following prior decisions such as Chaplinsky, "unpro-
tected speech" was viewed as regulable speech not fully protected
by the First Amendment.75
The United States Supreme Court, while accepting the Min-
nesota Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the St. Paul ordi-
nance, viewed differently the meaning of "unprotected." Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, found that while unprotected
speech-such as fighting words-could be regulated because of its
"constitutionally proscribable content," that does not mean that
the categories are "entirely invisible to the Constitution," such that
government can "regulate them based on hostility, or favoritism,
towards a nonproscribable message they contain."" The Court
focused on the content-based distinctions that the St. Paul ordi-
nance drew between different types of speech within the "fighting
words" category.7 As Justice White described it, the majority
"invented" an "underinclusiveness" test,78 whereby hate speech
regulations based on the proscribable nature of fighting words
cannot be addressed only to certain prejudices and epithets, as
that would be impermissible content and viewpoint discrimina-
tion.79 In evaluating the ordinance, the Court employed a less-
73 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Minnesota Supreme Court also relied on Brandenburg's
incitement to illegal activity exception in narrowing the St. Paul ordinance to the regula-
tion of only "unprotected speech." The court stated: "St. Paul's bias-motivated disorderly
conduct ordinance is also constitutional to the extent it prohibits conduct that is 'direct-
ed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.'" 464 N.W.2d at 510 (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)).
74 464 N.W.2d at 509-10. Chaplinsk, upheld a narrowly drawn state statute banning
face-to-face woids "having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to
whom, individually, the remark is addressed." 315 U.S. at 568. The test is whether a man
of "common intelligence" would view the words as "likely to cause an average addressee
to fight." Id. at 573. Since Chaplinsky, the Court has drawn back from a broad application
of the "fighting words" doctrine. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The Court's focus now centers on the likeli-
hood that the words will promote imminent violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
75 464 N.W.2d at 509-11. The Minnesota Supreme Court was following the tradition-
al interpretation of "unprotected speech."
76 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2543 (1992). Justice Scalia was reinterpreting
.unprotected speech" to mean something contrary to its traditional meaning.
77 Id. at 254748.
78 Id. at 2553 (White, J., concurring).
79 Id. at 2547-48. Justice Scalia illustrates the impermissible content-based speech
discrimination by stating: "Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or
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than-strict scrutiny test that included a special emphasis on the
narrowness of the speech category being regulated.80
Four concurring justices, while finding the St. Paul ordinance
unconstitutional, would have found it constitutional had the cir-
cumstances been different. In three separate concurring opinions,
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens based their decisions on the
overbreadth doctrine as the ordinance criminalized constitutionally
protected, as well as unprotected, speech.8 ' The concurrences
roundly attacked Justice Scalia's opinion as inconsistent, unprec-
edented, and unwarranted in its effect on First Amendment juris-
prudence-both in its protection of hate speech and in its likely
weakening of speech protection in general.8 2 Specifically, Justice
White strongly disagreed with the majority's creation and appli-
cation of the "underinclusiveness" doctrine. He observed:
[T]he Court's new "underbreadth" creation serves no desirable
function. Instead, it permits, indeed invites, the continuation of
expressive conduct that in this case is evil and worthless in
First Amendment terms .... Indeed, by characterizing fight-
ing words as a form of "debate,".., the majority legitimates
severe, are permissible unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics.
• . . The First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on
those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects." Id. at 2547. Justice Scalia de-
picts what he views as impermissible viewpoint discrimination when he states:
"[F]ighting words" that do not themselves invoke race, color, creed, religion, or
gender-aspersions upon a person's mother, for example-would seemingly be
usable ad libitum in the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by that speaker's opponents. One
could hold up a sign saying, for example, that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are mis-
begotten; but not that all "papists" are, for that would insult and provoke vio-
lence "on the basis of religion."
Id. at 2547-48.
80 Id. at 2550. Justice White views this approach as a general departure, or even
renunciation, of the strict scrutiny review which is usually applied in First Amendment
analysis. Id. at 2554 (White, J., concurring).
81 Id. (White, J. concurring). "[Were the ordinance not overbroad, I would vote to
uphold it." Id. at 2571 (Stevens, J., concurring).
82 Set id. at 2552-53 (White, J., concurring) (describing lack of precedent and
absence of need for majority decision). Justice White also draws attention to the majority
opinion's broader effects on free speech jurisprudence, when he states: "By placing fight-
ing words, which the Court has long held to be valueless, on at least equal constitutional
footing with political discourse and other forms of speech that we have deemed to have
the greatest social value, the majority devalues the latter category." Id. at 2554. Justice
Blackmun states that "the Court seems to abandon the categorical approach, and inevita-
bly to relax the level of scrutiny applicable to content-based laws. . . . [T]his weakens
the traditional protection of speech. If all expressive activity must be accorded the same
protection, that protection will be scant." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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hate speech as a form of public discussion.'
But for the overbreadth of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance, Justice White and the three84 other concurring Justices
would have upheld the ordinance.
The broad language and applicability of the majority opinion
in RA.V would seem to sound the death knell for hate speech
regulation, especially for statutes criminalizing hate speech. Howev-
er, the dissension within the Court, evidenced by the concurring
Justices' biting attacks on the majority, shows a ray of hope for the
future of hate speech regulation.85 In addition, all of the Justices
expressed their reprehension for burning crosses and similar ex-
pressions of hate, as well as their belief that the government has a
compelling interest in limiting discrimination.86 One can under-
stand why an average citizen, unschooled in constitutional nuanc-
es, would have difficulty comprehending how the United States
Constitution could protect such hateful activity, or as the dissent-
ers mused, why the United States Supreme Court would go
searching for a theory to justify such protection." With the short-
comings of R.A. V in mind, this Note suggests a workable alter-
native to bring the Court's free speech jurisprudence in line with
the modern citizen's conscience and intuition, and to allow more
comprehensive and effective hate speech regulation.
83 Id. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring). Justice White also wrote: "[A] ban on all
fighting words or on a subset of the fighting words category would restrict only the so-
cial evil of hate speech, without creating the danger of driving viewpoints from the mar-
ketplace." Id. at 2553.
84 In addition to Justices Stevens' and Blackmun's separate concurrences, Justice
O'Connor joined Justice White's concurring opinion.
85 See Defeis, supra note 44, at 66. In addition to the availability of a better ap-
proach to hate-speech regulation, whether this "ray of hope" expands to its full brilliance
in the future may depend on, among other things, the dynamics of the Court as justices
come and go.
86 See 112 S. Ct. at 2449-50 (Scalia, J.) (stating his belief that governmental interest
is compelling and that "burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible"); id. at
2556 (White, J., concurring) (stating similar beliefs).
87 See Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2348 (describing foreign lawyers' lack of comprehen-
sion of United States approach to hate speech). This is especially hard to fathom in light
of our past history of racism, the enactment of the Civil War Amendments (the 13th,
14th, and 15th), and the subsequent federal and state civil rights statutes and case law
protecting the rights of minorities.
For a discussion of Justice Scalia's "invention" of the majority's analysis in R.A.Y,
see 112 S. Ct. at 2553-56 (White, J., concurring).
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D. A Reevaluation
1. R.A.V Falls Short
R.A.V falls short of the optimum protection of all citizen's
rights because, in finding the hate speech ordinance unconstitu-
tional, the decision focuses only on the speaker's rights. What
about the other side of hate speech confrontations, namely, the
victim-listener's rights?
In RA.V, the majority opinion focused on the alleged injury
to the crossburners' First Amendment rights.88 In so doing, the
Court ignored the injuries and rights of hate speech victims, such
as the black family which was confronted with a burning cross on
their front lawn, as well as the history and hatred for which such
symbols stand.89 As stated by Profess or Lawrence, "the Court was
not concerned with how this attack might impede the exercise of
the Joneses' constitutional right to be full and valued participants
in the political community. :..90
The R.A. V majority opinion fails in more than just its lack of
consideration for the victims' rights and injuries; it ignores the
broader danger of hate speech, especially racist hate speech. In
addition to being disconcerting, painful, and degrading,9 hate
speech is intimidating.92 Because of such intimidation, "[h]ate
speech frequently silences its victims, who more often than not,
are those who are already heard from least."3 The Court needs
to consider the "historical reality that some members of our com-
munity are less powerful than others and that those persons con-
88 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2540 (1992); see Lawrence, supia note 19, at 789.
89 Professor Matsuda writes: "Victims of vicious hate propaganda have experienced
physiological symptoms and emotional distress ranging from fear in the gut, rapid pulse
rate and difficulty breathing, nightmares, post-traumatic stress disorder, hypertension, psy-
chosis, and suicide." Matsuda, supra .note 6, at 2336 (footnote omitted); see also In re
RA.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 508 (1991) (describing harms of hate activities such as
crossbuming and the obligation of the community to combat them). See generally BELL,
supra note 16, at 519-26; Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2335-41 (citing specific negative effects
of racist hate messages); Munster, supra note 60, at 350-51 (describing various physical
and mental injuries to victims of racist hate speech).
The definition of "victims' rights"-equality, free speech, protection from verbal and
physical assault, and human dignity, for example-is developed in Part III.D.
90 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 789.
91 See supra note 89 (defining hate speech injuries).
92 See Lawrence, supra note 19, at 799-804 (describing the silencing and intimidation
of hate-speech victims).
93 Id. at 792.
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tinue to be systematically silenced by those who are more pow-
erful."9  Hate speech which attacks an immutable characteristic,
such as race or ethnicity, "contributes to the victim's sense of
helplessness" and frustration, as one's race or ethnicity cannot be
changed to mitigate the hatred." The RA.V majority has ignored
the broader subordination effect of racist hate speech, which, by
the injurious content of the speech and the intimidation that must
result therefrom, effectively kills any response to the racist at-
tack.96
The individual victim, though, is not the only silenced indi-
vidual. Hate speech impugns the rights and worth of the entire
target race, and thereby chills discourse on a broader scale.97 The
enforced silence resulting from racist hate .speech runs counter to
intrinsic and instrumental values of speech.98 "For African-Ameri-
94 Id. at 804.
95 Munster, supra note 60, at 349.
96 See Lawrence, supra note 19, at 787 (describing anti-subordination theory); see also
BELL, supra note 16, at 523-26 (depicting oppressive speech as a "badge of servitude" on
the same level as segregation); Delgado, supra note 12, at 292-94 (defining the class sub-
ordination effects of hate speech and racism).
KA.V. creates a very difficult situation for communities wishing to regulate hate
speech because its "underbreadth" doctrine, coupled with the overbreadth doctrine, limits
the scope of any definition of a proscribable class of speech, such as fighting words. In
other words, a community can only prohibit a speech class that fits between these two
doctrines-broad enough to satisfy "underbreadth," but narrow enough not to violate
overbreadth and vagueness. RA.V. "reduc[es] protection across the board" by providing
that "a State cannot regulate speech that causes great harm unless it also regulates
speech that does not (setting law and logic on their heads)." 112 S. Ct. at 2560
(Blackmun, J., concurring). It is difficult to imagine a hate speech regulation that prohib-
its such a broad class of speech. but does not also violate overbreadth and vagueness.
The effect of Justice Scalia's opinion in RA.V-ultimately protecting the free
speech rights of criminals in their hate speech assaults--is ironic in light of his conserva-
tive tendency to decide issues against criminal defendants. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH,
JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSERVATIVE MOMENT 85 (1993)
[hereinafter SMITH, CONSERVATIVE MOMENT] (describing Justice Scalia's support of conser-
vative outcomes in nonunanimous criminal justice cases); Christopher E. Smith, Justice
Antonin Scalia and Criminal Justice Cases, 81 KY. LJ. 187, 193, 200 (1993) (demonstrating
that Justice Scalia, second only to Chief Justice Rehnquist, decides 86% of criminal justice
cases against criminal defendants in nonunanimous cases). Justice Scalia's textualist ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation, coupled with his focus in R.A.V on the speech
aspects over the criminal aspects, may explain this seeming inconsistency. See SMITH, CON-
SERVATIVE MOMENT, supra, at 29-36 (describing Justice Scalia's textualist approach).
97 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 792 & nn.25-26; see also Matsuda, supra note 6, at
2338-40 (describing not only the victim's injuries, but also the restrictive effect on "non-
target-group members," such as whites, as a result of an "atmosphere rife with racial ha-
tred").
98 See supra Part III.A. (defining the historic and intrinsic values of freedom of
speech).
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cans, the intrinsic value of.speech as self-expression and self-defini-
tion has been particularly important. The absence of a 'black
voice' was central to the ideology of European-American racism,
an ideology that denied Africans their humanity and thereby justi-
fied their enslavement."99 The protection of hate speech breathes
new life and currency into this discriminatory ideology.
Hate speech silences the target individual or group,"° mini-
mizing their contribution to public discourse and effectively de-
stroying the free trade of ideas in the supposedly equally-accessible
marketplace."0 ' Thus; the Supreme Court's approach in RA.V.
doesn't just fall short in a negligible way. It falls short in a danger-
ously far-reaching way; a way that may have broad negative effects
on our ability to combat racism in our society.
2. New Considerations
In addition to the Court's failure to consider the rights of the
victim in RA.Y, new theories and approaches have recently devel-
oped in this area of the law. These new theories demonstrate the
current concern and dissatisfaction with the Court's present atti-
tude toward hate speech regulation. The search. continues for
some approach that will better protect the rights and dignity of
the hate speech victim, while maintaining conscientious protection
of freedom of speech.
First, some advocate focusing more strictly on the "values"
that underlie our protection of free speech. They would have the
scope of free speech protection "be determined by the broadest
range of purposes or values that can coherently be thought to
99 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 800.
100 See Delgado, supra note 12, at 292-94 (describing the process by which a race or
class is subordinated and stigmatized as inferior); Lawrence, supra note 19, at 792, 796-97,
800-04 (defining antisubordination theory).
101 See supra note 39 (defining the "marketplace of ideas" theory); BELL, supra note
16, at 525-26; LAWRENCE, supra note 19, at 800 (explaining the infringement of the free
speech values of hate speech victims as a result of the silence imposed on them by the
hate-speaker). As Professor Bell states:
The marketplace theory . . . of free speech rests upon a naive or convenient as-
sumption that in our democratic society all speakers occupy a level playing field
in which all speech is presumptively equal . . . . Yet, like all social goods,
speech is not equally and freely accessible to all . . . . The marketplace analogy
also presumes that the discourse of all speech is in fact a dialogue. But racist
invectives are one-sided; they neither invite, nor permit response.
BELL, supra note 16, at 525-26. In other words, hate speech is antithetical to the market-
place theory-the arguably prevailing theory of free speech protection.
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underlie the free speech clause." ' 2 These "values" would be lim-
ited to such ideals as the "search for truth" and individual self-ful-
fillment, which arguably would not include hate speech."03 Simi-
larly, excluding the protection of speech that does not communi-
cate some sort of social idea,"0 4 but rather is simply abusive,
would also limit hate speech.
Hate speech regulations function as more than just protective
measures. They also serve a declaratory function by providing at
least a threshold nondiscriminatory standard of speech and con-
duct for the entire community.' In other words, laws influence
attitudes and culture. Antidiscrimination legislation helps shape
the collective mind of the populace in a less biased mold.' The
search for better protection of the rights of hate speech victims
defines each of these new theories and observations.
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection has also been ad-
vanced as a limiting ideal in the area of hate speech. 10 7 It is ar-
gued that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment reflects our choice not
to permit absolute freedom at the expense of equality and equal
personhood." 1°0  This argument relies to some extent on
102 R GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LA' 1 (1990).
103 Id. at 2-6; see also EMERSON, supra note 40, at 1-15; supra Part III.A. (describing
the basic theories of freedom of speech in the United States). As Professor Hartman
writes:
Hate speech does not merit full constitutional protection because it disserves the
values underlying the First Amendment. These values include preparing citizens
to make the decisions required of a self-governing society, advancing the univer-
sal search for truth, and promoting self-expression in order to foster personal
development.
Rhonda G. Hartman, Hateful Expression and First Amendment Values: Toward a Theory of
Constitutional Constraint on Hate Speech at Colleges and Universities After R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 19
J.C. & U.L. 343, 363 (1993)(footnotes omitted).
104 See WRIGHT, supra note 102, at 69-70. Social value is tied to speech that puts
forth an argument that can be explained or responded to by other arguments before any
action is taken. As noted above, hate-speech does not allow for any meaningful respon-
sive expression, and therefore, under this definition, hate speech can have no "social
value." See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text (describing the silencing effects of
hate speech on the victim-listener).
105 Michael Banton, The Declaratory Value of Laws Against Racial Incitement, in STRIKING
A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 349, 357. Banton writes: "While ideas can influence
behaviour, behaviour can influence ideas just as strongly. The prohibition, by law or
custom, of certain forms of behaviour can influence the way people think about possible
behaviour ... ." Id. at 350.
106 Id,
107 "No State shall .. .deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See BELL, supra note 16, at 522-23:
Delgado. supra note 12, at 291-94; Defeis, supra note 44, at 68-74.
108 BELL, supra note 16, at 526. As Professor Delgado states: "[Regulation of] the
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reinterpreting Fourteenth. Amendment equal protection-from a
strict and formal reading to a general and substantive interpreta-
tion."9 Under this interpretation, the equality principle would be
affirmative in nature. In other words, the government would not
just be prohibited from treating its citizens unequally, but would
be required to promote equality throughout society." Hate
speech regulations would be one equal protection tool that the
government could use to promote equality between the various
groups in our society."'
speech by which society 'constructs' a stigma picture of minorities . . . may be necessary
for full effectuation of the values of equal personhood we hold equally dear." Delgado,
supra note 12, at 292.
109 See MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at 71 (describing need to inform
free speech jurisprudence with Fourteenth Amendment principles, but referring to to
"equality," rather than equal protection, in terms of "the problem of social inequality or
the mandate of substantive legal equality."). See generally Lawrence, supra note 19, at 788
n.14, 792 (discussing equality concepts in speech contexts); MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS,
supra note 18, at 71-110 (discussing equality and speech).
110 As Professor MacKinnon states:
When equality is recognized as a constitutional value and mandate, the idea that
some people are inferior to others on the basis of group membership is authori-
tatively rejected as the basis of public policy. This does not mean that ideas to
the contrary cannot be debated or expressed. It should mean, however, that
social inferiority cannot be imposed through any means, including expressive
ones.
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at 106. Under this model of equality of
speech, "[t]he state will have as great a role in providing relief from injury to equality
through speech and in giving equal access to speech as it now has in disciplining its
power to intervene in that speech that manages to get expressed." Id. at 109. This system
is exemplified in Canada's affirmative equality approach to hate speech. See generally id. at
97-110 (demonstrating application and positive effects of equality principles as found in
Canada's free speech and equality jurisprudence).
111 Of course, the state action requirement hampers the hate speech applications of
the equal protection clause, especially in situations where the speech is between individu-
als with absolutely no tie to government action-private discrimination cases. However.
the state action requirement may be overcome by the police power of the states or by
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states: "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment]." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Professor MacKinnon draws attention to the possible application
of § 5 and state powers in stating that "federal equality statutes have not been seen to
arise under the Fourteenth Amendment, although it expressly authorizes them, and ac-
tion by states against social inequalities needs no constitutional authority .... "
MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at 73-74 (footnote omitted). Although there
are perhaps more arguments for overcoming current Fourteenth Amendment restrictions.
a full exposition of these issues and arguments is beyond the scope of thig Note. See
generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8. ch. 12 (State Action); id. ch. 14 (Equal Pro-
tection); id. ch. 15 (Congressional Enforcement of Civil Rights).
This argument serves as another example of new considerations and approaches to
hate speech that the Supreme Court has failed to consider in its hate speech jurispru-
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Under current Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, the
equality argument requires acknowledging the rights of the victim-
listener as being worthy of protection on par with those of the
speaker. The quasi-absolutist protection of the hate speaker, allow-
ing him to subordinate and shout down the listener,"2 is an im-
permissible limiting of the listener's fundamental rights under an
"affirmative" equal protection analysis."1 In other words, if the
speakers' and listeners' speech rights are equal in validity and
indistinguishable in character, then any disparity in the treatment
of speakers' rights over listeners' rights would be based on an
arbitrary and indefensible classification."' In RA.V, for example,
the free speech rights of the victim-listener are infringed by the
Court's failure to uphold the ordinance that protects them from
the silencing effects of the hate-speaker.
In short, our First Amendment jurisprudence falls short and
remains unclear." 5 However, Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection analysis doesn't provide absolute clarity either."6 These
two amendments approach the hate speech dilemma from oppo-
site directions-one from freedom and one from equality-and in
fact they often conflict directly with each other in any given
case."
7
The problem is that the Constitution lacks a "general con-
struction clause to prohibit the exercise of rights specified in the
Constitution to infringe or destroy other rights guaranteed in the
dence. Additionally, the argument for equality of recognition and protection of freedom
of speech-for both speaker and listener-relates closely to the international approach.
See supra IVA-B.; see also Defeis, supra note 44, at 69, 71-73 (demonstrating the interna-
tional ideals of equality and nondiscrimination through United Nations documents, in-
cluding the ICCPR, and the German and Canadian courts).
112 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (depicting the silencing of hate-speech
victims). In describing the negative effects of failing to apply equalitarian values to free
speech. Professor MacKinnon writes: "[T]he less speech you have, the more the speech
of those who have it keeps you unequal; the more the speech of the dominant is pro-
tected, the more dominant they become and the less the subordinated are heard from
.. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at 72-73.
113 "Whenever fundamental rights are limited, the laws will have to promote an over-
riding or compelling interest of government in order to be valid .... " NOWAK & RO-
TUNDA, supra note 8, at 569.
114 "The equal protection clause guarantees that similar individuals will be dealt with
in a similar manner by the government." Id at 570.
115 See supra Parts II.B. and III.D.I. (depicting the short-comings of the United States
approach in terms of its failure to protect the rights of the victim-listener).
116 See Delgado, supra note 12, at 291.
117 See, e.g., Defeis, supra note 44, at 74; Delgado, supra note 12, at 292.
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Constitution." ' In other words, the Constitution provides little
guidance for circumstances in which the freedom right of one
citizen, such as freedom to express hatred, conflicts directly with
the equality right of another, such as the right to be equally
heard. Consequently, without some definition of the interrelation
of free speech and equal protection, the preference for First
Amendment freedom of speech wins out almost exclusively. 9 In
general, R.A.V exemplifies this problem, as the Court, without
some mandate to consider other rights, such as listeners' rights,
focused solely on the infringement of the crossburner's freedom
of speech, even though the speech was hateful, racist, and intimi-
dating.20 This single-right approach narrows the Court's per-
spective too much. It allows for the one-sided protection of the
speaker's freedom of speech by treating the victim-listener's free-
dom of speech as "less equal" and less valid.
Therefore, a new approach is necessary to overcome the
short-comings of the Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V The con-
flicting opinions in the RA.Y decision and the new theories of
free speech limitation demonstrate the continuing uncertainty in
this area of the law and, perhaps, an openness to new solu-
tions.' The United States ratification of the ICCPR in June,
199 2," the same month the Court decided KA.V, demonstrates
the continuing uncertainty and possible openness to change within
the hate speech arena.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE-THE INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
A. Principles of International Human Rights
Human rights and civil rights are a major focus of interna-
tional law and recent international treaties.121 Since medieval
118 Defeis, supra note 44, at 62.
119 Id. at 74. See generally MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS, supra note 18, at 72-77 (describ-
ing preeminent position of free speech relative to equal protection "at the equality-speech
interface").
120 112 S. Ct. 2358, 2540 (1992). See also Lawrence, supra note 19, at 791 ("Justice
Scalia's words betray his inability to see the Joneses [the victims in RA.V.] or hear their
voices.").
121 See supra Parts II.C.2. and III.D.2 (depicting Court's uncertainty and openness to
change).
122 SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COV-
ENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, reprinted in 31 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 645
(1992).
123 See THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
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times, countries have shown concern for individuals in other coun-
tries."' This concern has increased dramatically since World War
II as a result of the atrocious disregard for basic human rights
during and after the War. 25 In fact, the purpose of the United
Nations (UN) is, to a large extent, insuring and protecting the
rights of all people. 26 To that end, the international community
and the UN rely on international treaties and covenants to delin-
eate specific rights. The obligation of signatory states to protect
the civil rights of their citizens under these treaties provides the
mechanism for their implementation. 27
International human and civil rights agreements are uniformly
grounded on several basic principles. These basic principles explic-
itly include: the value of human dignity,2 ' nondiscrimination
and equality, 29 and a balanced view of the interrelation of com-
RIGHTS 1-4 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS].
124 Id.
125 Id. at 5. See also Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, The Political Framework, in
U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 1, 7.
126 Defeis, supra note 44, at 74-75. The U.N. Charter is based on "'faith in the fun-
damental human rights, ... in the dignity of the human person,' and in the 'equal
rights of men and women.'" Id. at 75 (quoting U.N. CHARTER preamble). "Among the
purposes of the United Nations is international cooperation 'in promoting and encour-
aging respect for human rights and fundamental freedom for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion.'" Id. (quoting U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3), 5).
127 See Defeis, supra note 44, at 75 & n.96; THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 123, at 8-11 (speaking generally of efforts to implement the ideals of the U.N.
Charter up to and including the adoption of the ICCPR).
The ICCPR is enforced at the international level by the Human Rights Committee
[hereinafter "the Committee"] established in Article 28. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 28, re-
printed in BOSSuIT, at 501. The Commitee is responsible for receiving and evaluating the
mandatory national reports submitted by signatory nations in regard to their efforts to
give domestic effect to the provisions of the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 40, reprint-
ed in Bossuyr, at 615. Interstate reporting-one state reporting the ICCPR violations of
another-is provided for in Articles 41 an 42. ICCPR, supra note 1, arts. 41-42, reprinted
in Bossur, at 635, 689. There is also an optional individual communications procedure,
whereby an individual in a signatory state can report violations which have injured them.
See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (demonstrating Committee's duties as ap-
plied to hate speech case in Canada). Annually, the Committee reports to the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly on the progress and violations of the signatory nations, and the U.N. re-
sponds accordingly under its charter. ICCPR. supra note 1, art. 40(5), reprinted in
BossmXr, at 631 (defining Committee's duty to make its General Assembly report). See
generally DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUiAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVEL-
OPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 50-51 (describ-
ing functions of Human Rights Committee). By signing the ICCPR, the United States has
subjected itself to Committee jurisdiction and U.N. sanction for any ICCPR violation.
128 "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights." Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d. Sess., at 71, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948), reprinted in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 123, app.
at 372.
129 See. e.g., Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "All are equal
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peting rights.' Such principles directly implicate the hate
speech issue. They require a balancing of the speaker's right to
free speech against the listener's right to have her inherent hu-
man dignity protected from hate speech injuries.
Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR directly implement these
principles by defining the relationship between the opposing rights
of freedom of expression and freedom from hate speech. Article
20 requires that signatory nations prohibit hate speech. Thus, this
international approach frames the hate speech issue in a manner
notably different from that of the United States Supreme Court.
While the direct effect of the ICCPR in the United States may be
limited,' a comparison of the ICCPR and United States ap-
proaches provides interpretive principles that can improve our
hate speech jurisprudence. This comparison requires an examina-
tion of the ICCPR's provisions affecting hate speech-Articles 19
and 20-before its domestic application is considered.
B. Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR
The ICCPR is fundamentally based on equality, nondiscrimina-
tion, and the need to balance the rights of all individuals in order
to better protect the rights of each.' In fact, equalitarian,
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law." THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 373.
130 Article 29(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, pro-
vides:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to
such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting
the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
Id. at 377.
131 See infra Part IV.D (discussing ICCPR reservations and self-executing doctrine
which limit its application in United States).
132 The ICCPR in its preamble demonstrates the equalitarian and the dignitarian
arguments in its "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family . . . ." ICCPR, supra note 1, pmbl.. reprinted
in BOSSLT, at 1. "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law." ICCPP, supra note 1, art. 26, reprinted in
BOSSUrY, at 479. Equality is provided to "the extent that this principle coincides with the
principle of non-discrimination . ,. . ." Garibaldi, supra note 14, at 69.
As to nondiscrimination, Article 2, paragraph 1 requires signatory states to "respect
and ensure . . . the rights recognized in the [ICCPR], without distinction of any kind.
such as race, coulour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or so-
cial origin, property, birth or other status." ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(1), reprinted in
BossuYr, at 49. Many of the ICCPR's various articles contain nondiscrimination language.
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dignitarian, and nondiscrimination principles have risen to the
level of jus cogens, or "peremptory norms binding on all as supe-
rior law," in customary international law.13  In the international
scheme, generally, an individual's rights are not absolute. Individu-
al rights carry certain obligations to others and to the communi-
ty.134  In other words, exercising an individual right to the detri-
ment of others will not be tolerated. Significantly, this internation-
al approach specifically prohibits private discriminations, recogniz-
ing the debilitating individual and societal effects of that meritless
activity." Most importantly for hate speech discussion, the
ICCPR recognizes the importance of balancing both sides of a
conflict between two individual rights.' Here, the opposing
rights are freedom of expression and freedom from hate
advocacy's discriminatory assaults on individual and community
dignity, as embodied in ICCPR Articles 19 and 20, respectively.
Article 19, paragraph 2: "Everyone shall have the right to freedom
See generally Garibaldi, supra note 14, at 62-69.
The balancing of competing rights is demonstrated in Articles 5 and 19. Article 5,
paragraph 1, provides: "Nothing in the [ICCPRI may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity ... aimed at the destruction
of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein . . . ." ICCPR, supra note 1, art.
5(1), reprinted in BOSSUYT, at 103. For pertinent parts of Article 19, see infra notes 137,
139 and accompanying text.
133 B. G. Ramcharan, Equality and Nondiscrimination, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 246, 249. "Customary norms of international law are those-
that are so widely accepted by the international community that they are binding even
on states that have not ratified treaties embodying them." Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S.
and International Judicial Protection of Individual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis
and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 805, 816 (1990). Jus cogens cannot be changed by
agreement; they are nonderogable. Id. at 817. While often it is difficult to show that a
principle has reached the level of jus cogens, "credible arguments have been made that
most, if not all, international human rights standards satisfy this test." Id. at 816.
134 See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 5(1), reprinted in BossuYr, at 105; id. art. 29(2),
reprinted in BOSSUvr, at 516; see also Defeis, supra note 44. at 71-73 (describing the inter-
national ideals of rights limitations and resultant community obligations).
135 Ramcharan, supra note 133, at 261-63. The United States courts and Congress
have handled private discrimination less clearly than the international prohibition, al-
though even the international approach is clouded by some notion of personal choice.
Id. at 262. United States courts generally have required state action as an element of
discrimination cases, especially in Fourteenth Amendment cases. "Most of the protections
for individual rights and liberties contained in the Constitution and its amendments apply
only to the actions of governmental entities." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 452.
While the state action requirement has been relaxed to some extent recently, it remains
an important part of American case law. Id. at 457.
136 Defeis, supra note 44, at 126-27; THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note
123, at 30. Article 5, paragraph 1 of the ICCPR speaks to this balancing specifically. See
supra note 132 (quoting in part ICCPR art. 5(1)).
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of expression .. Article 20, paragraph 2: "Any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law." "
Article 19, paragraph 2, provides the right to free expression.
Article 20 directly limits free speech in its prohibition of national,
racial, and religious hate advocacy. These conflicting principles
frame the debate over the relative boundaries of free speech pro-
tection and hate speech regulation, seemingly presenting an incon-
sistency within the ICCPR. However, the ICCPR solves, at least
facially, its. own inconsistency in Aiticle 19, paragraph 3, which
provides:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this
article carries with it special dudes and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are:provided by law and are necessary: (a) For re-
spect of the rights or reputation of others .
Thus, Article 19, paragraph 3, reinforces the Article 20 principle
by requiring respect for the rights of others, including listeners.
Freedom of expression is public and relational and therefore
should be subject to moral and legal restrictions.40 In Article 19,
paragraph 3, the right for which free speech can and should be
restricted in'order to properly respect the rights of the "others,"
the listeners, is the right provided in Article 20--the right not to
be confronted with hate speech.'4' Thus, Articles 19 and 20 dem-
137 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19(2), reprinted in BOSsuIYr, at 381.
138 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 20(2); reprinted in BOsur, at 403.
139 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 19(3), reprinted in Bossu,'r, at 386.
140 See BossuYr, supra note 1, at 378 -(reprinting debate and discussion from the
Commission on Human Rights in the 5th Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), and 8th
Session (1952)).
141 Such a right, or at least a provision for sanctions against a hate speaker, has
been suggested and further defined by the Human Rights Committee of the U.N., which
administers the ICCPR and other international human rights agreements, and provides
guidance on their meaning and use. See supra note 127 (describing Committee's responsi-
bilities and authority). The Committee, for example, decided one case directly on the
Article 20 hate speech issue, JR.T. and the W.G. Party v. Canada (see infra note 144),
thereby providing definition to that Article. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text:
see also Ineke Boerifijn & Joanna Oyediran, Artic 20 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights. in STRIKING A BALANcE, supra note 6, at 29, 31; Karl Josef Partsch,
Freedom of Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF
RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 209, 230 ("Article 20 constitutes a further limitation on Article
19.").
While the RA.V Court recognized the harms of hate speech, the right not to be
confronted by it was not recognized. See supra Part III.C-D (discussing R.A.V and its fail-
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onstrate a balancing approach to conflicting, interrelated rights by
allowing for the limited restriction of one right in order to more
fully effectuate another.
Although Article 19 free speech is not absolute, neither is the
right to be protected from hate speech as defined in Article 20.
In Article 20, "advocacy" consists of more than simply expressing
hatred; it must include a certain amount of incitement of oth-
ers-specifically, incitement, or "strong encouragement," to display
"discrimination, violence or hostility," probably within a reasonably
short time. 142 Thus, it is doubtful that the mere utterance of ra-
cial epithets or rhetoric would be too easily prohibited or pun-
ished under Article 20 legislation; racial expressions by themselves
would not usually be seen as inciting others to discriminate or be-
come violent.'
A fact scenario more deserving, and more exemplary, of hate
speech regulation under Article 20 is found in J.R. T. and the W. G.
Party v. Canada.' A Canadian human rights tribunal issued a
cease and desist order against the defendants for operating a re-
corded telephone message service which warned callers that Jews
were perverse and lazy, and responsible for world wars, unemploy-
ment, inflation, and the spread of communism.'45 The defen-
dants refused to comply, were held in contempt by the Canadian
Federal Court, and subsequently applied to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee for relief from this alleged infringement of their
ure to recognize the victim-listeners' rights).
142 Partsch, supra note 141, at 228. "Incitement to 'discrimination' and 'violence' are
legally defined (or definable) concepts. 'Hostility' is an attitude and only a further moral
qualification of the incitement." Id. Partsch also defines other terms that are relevant to
the international approach to hate speech and racism. Id. at 228-30.
143 Depending, of course, on the circumstances and reactions caused by the state-
ments, this should be the outcome under the narrowing construction of "advocacy" and
"incitement." See id. (defining international hate speech terms). This accords with broad
speech protection and with the test, as informed by the international balancing approach
proposed later in Part V of this Note. See supra note 127 (describing Human Rights Com-
mittee and its authority to interpret provisions of the ICCPR).
144 See P. R. Gandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communi-
cation, 1986 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 201, 240 (citing Report of the Human Rights Committee. U.N.
GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 234, 236, U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983)). See supra note
127 (describing duties of Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR).
Although this case is a good application of Article 20, it is probably not the most
clear example of hate speech; in the United States it would be heatedly argued, to be
sure. However, these cases, even in the international arena, are relatively rare. Under the
test formulated in Part V of this Note, a similar result should follow.
145 John Manwaring, Legal Regulation of Hate Propaganda in Canada, in STRIKING A
BALANCE, supra note 6, at 106, 117-18.
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right to free expression under ICCPR, Article 19(2).146 The Com-
mittee refused to admit the application for consideration, finding
that Article 20(2) bf the ICCPR directly prohibited this clear advo-
cacy of racial or religious hatred. "7 Decisions such as these help
define Article 20 of the ICCPR and demonstrate its application.
A layperson might see little distinction between Article 20 and
the United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence on "fighting
words" and incitement to illegal conduct. "8 As seen in the Unit-
ed States' proposed amendment to Article 19 of the ICCPR 9
and in Brandenburg v. Ohio,50 restrictions on expressions would
be allowed to prevent incitement to violence. 5' The important
difference, and the one most troublesome to the United States in
ratifying the ICCPR, lies in Article 20's prohibition of not only
incitement to violence but incitement to "discrimination" and
"hostility" as well.'52 Hostility and, to a lesser extent, discrimina-
tion are rather overbroad and vague to comport with the United
States' more absolutist protection of free speech, especially as they
implicate content-based restrictions."S  By signing the ICCPR,
what obligations has the United States incurred?
146 Id. See Gandhi, supra note 144, at 240.
147 Id. The U.N. Human Rights Committee stated:
[N]ot only is the author's 'right' to communicate racist ideas not protected by
the [ICCPR], it is in fact incompatible with its provisions .... [T]he opinions
which [the applicant] seeks to disseminate through the telephone system clearly
constitute the advocacy of racial or religious hatred which Canada has an obliga-
tion under Article 20(2) of the Covenant to prohibit.
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 234, 236,
U.N. Doc. A/38/40 (1983).
148 See supra notes 55-56, 74 (citing Chaplinsky and Brandenburg's treatment and devel-
opment of "fighting words" and incitement, respectively).
149 See Bosstr, supra note 1, at 395. The proposed United States reservation to
Article 19 would have limited any restrictions on free speech under paragraph 3 of that
Article to those defined by incitement to violence, as defined by such cases as
Brandenburg, not incitement to hostility or discrimination.
150 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
151 Defeis, supra note 44, at 81 & n.122.
152 See David Filvaroff et al., The Substantive Rights and United States Law, in U.S. RATI-
FICATION, supra note 14, at 71, 119.
153 See Partsch, supra note 141, at 228-29 (defining the various terms employed in
Article 20). Partsch states that incitement to "hostility" is really the only problematic defi-
nition, as the "difference between 'hatred' and 'hostility' is not certain; perhaps 'hatred'
has a strong subjective element while 'hostility' suggests an attitude displayed externally."
Id. at 228. See also Defeis, supra note 44, at 81 (describing the United States opposition
to Article 19(3)'s content-based nature).
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C. United States Obligations Under the ICCPR
Generally, when the United States ratifies a treaty, that treaty
becomes the "supreme law of the land," with power equivalent to
that of a federal statute, although ultimately subordinate to the
Constitution.'54 International treaties create not only internation-
al obligations, but may also become part of domestic law, enforced
by federal statutes and the President.'55 Article 2 of the ICCPR
defines the substantive obligations of signatory states.'56 A signa-
tory nation must "respect and ensure" the individual and commu-
nity rights provided for in the ICCPR, and it must provide effec-
tive remedial, adjudicatory and enforcement procedures for viola-
tions of those rights. 57 The obligation to "respect" the rights des-
ignated in the ICCPR simply entails the government not violating
154 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " U.S. CONsT. art. VI,
cl. 2. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
As to the constitutional limits on the validity and relative power of treaties, Justice
Field stated:
That the treaty power of the United States extends to all proper subjects of
negotiation between our government and the governments of other nations, is
clear .. .. The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms un-
limited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government . . . . It would not be contended that it extends so
far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the character
of the government or in that of one of the States ....
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1890); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
Another major element of a United States treaty that needs to be considered is the
executory nature of the treaty. See infra Part IV.D.; infra notes 158-59; Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); see generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8. at 214; Stew-
art, supra note 1. at 78; Anne M. Williams, United States Treaty Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION,
supra note 14, at 35.
155 See Williams, supra note 154, at 44-49. Domestic implications of treaties depend on
such things as the nature of the treaty, whether it is self-executing, and whether the
appropriate branch of government implements it. See supra note 154 (describing United
States treaty doctrine generally).
156 ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2, reprinted in BossumT, at 52, 64-70. Signatory obliga-
tions as to treaty compliance are generally governed by the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See
Massimo Coccia, Reservations to the Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights, 15 CAL. W. INr'L
LJ. 1, 7 (1985) (describing the Vienna Convention, its application, and its influence on
international treaty law). While Article 2 defines the international obligations of signatory
nations, it does not necessarily have the same domestic effects. See infra Part N.E (dis-
cussing treaty reservations, especially with regard to United States treaty doctrine).
157 Id. See also Filvaroff, supra note 152, at 83-88 (describing Article 2 and its appli-
cation in the United States).
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those rights."'8 The obligation to "ensure" connotes affirmative
action by the state to enable individuals to enjoy and exercise
those rights. 59 To "ensure" requires not only limits on the gov-
ernment, but also on private individuals, to some extent, to pro-
hibit them from inhibiting the exercise of the Covenant rights of
others.' 60
Thus, under the terms of the ICCPR, the United States
'should be obligated to "respect and ensure" the rights of citizens
as defined in the ICCPR-not only freedom of speech, but also
freedom from hate speech. As illustrated in Article 20, hate
speech restrictions and a process for their adjudication, remedy,
and enforcement should be provided by law. However, this is not
the case in the United States. How is that possible? The answer,
or at least a justification, lies in the reservations, understandings,
and declarations that the United States made in ratifying the
ICCPR.
D. United States Reservations
Even without reservations.6 and other treaty limitations, the
United States approach to domestic treaty implementation is less
straightforward and clear than Article VI of the Constitution sug-
gests: "This Constitution ... and all Treaties made . . .under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land . *...""' This language clearly states that upon signing a
treaty, its provisions should automatically become the binding
"Law of the Land"-binding domestic law. However, "[g]iven the
isolationist bent of the American legal system, it is unlikely that
international human rights law will generally be deemed to be
directly incorporated into U.S. law." 6' The government of the
United States ,prefers to have more discretion in implementing
158 Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Der-
ogations, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 123, at 72, 77: Garibaldi,
supra note 14, at 54-57.
159 Buergenthal, supra note 158, at 77; Garibaldi, supra note 14, at 55.
160 Buergenthal, supra note 158, at 77-78.
161 As defined in the Vienna Convention, a "reservation" is a "unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving
or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of
certain provisions of the treaty in their application to. that state." Vienna Convention, su-
pra note 156, art. 2(d).
162 U.S. CONsT. art. VI. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (describing the
validity and relative power of treaties under the Constitution).
163 Strossen, supra note 133, at 805.
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international treaties domestically than Article VI of the Constitu-
tion facially seems to allow. This preference is advanced by the
judicial doctrine of "self-executing treaties,"'' which often pre-
vents the direct incorporation of such international documents
into domestic law. If a treaty is considered to be "non-self-execut-
ing," 5 then congressional legislation is required to give it do-
mestic force.
The United States Senate declared the ICCPR a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty.66 The declaration notifies the courts that they can-
not use the ICCPR directly until Congress and the Executive
Branch pass legislation allowing such action. This effectively re-
moves implementation of the ICCPR from the judiciary and places
it in the hands of the Executive and Legislative branches.'67 The
decision to make the ICCPR non-self-executing was driven by Con-
gressional fear of excessive litigation of the vague wording of the
ICCPR as well as a preference not to use the unicameral treaty
power under Article VI of the Constitution to change domestic
law." Thus the United States uses a dichotomous approach to
the implementation of its international human rights agreements;
it accepts its full obligations internationally, but reserves the op-
tion to only partially implement them domestically. 69 Thus, even
164 This doctrine has developed from Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829),
in which Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently,
to be regarded ... as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, whenever it oper-
ates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of
the stipulation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform
a particular act the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial depart-
ment; and the Legislature must execute the contract before it can become a
rule for the court.
Id. at 314. See Stewart, supra note 1, at 79; Strossen, supra note 133, at 812-15.
165 "Non-self-executing" means that the treaty is not "capable of being applied or
enforced directly by the courts," especially where the treaty shows an intent not to be
effective as domestic law. Williams, supra note 154, at 46-47.
166 SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. EXEC. Doc. No. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1992)
[hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT] (Declaration 1 defines the non-self-executing
nature of United States ratification of the ICCPR), reprinted in 31 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
645 (1992).
167 Stewart, supra note 1, at 79. However, there is some dispute as to the effect of
such declarations, as "[iut is for the courts and not the Senate to decide whether a mul-
tilateral treaty provision is self-executing." David Weissbrodt, Globalization of Constitutional
Law and Civil Rights, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 261, 268 (1993).
168 Weissbrodt, supra note 167, at 268.
169 Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer, Conclusion, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note
14, at 281, 286. "Apart from accusations that the United States is guilty of its own dou-
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while joining the international community under the ICCPR, the
United States provides itself with an escape hatch to maintain its
domestic protection of hate speech in violation of the treaty.
Additionally, the United States made direct reservations to
Article 20 of the ICCPR in order to preserve its quasi-absolutist
protection of free speech, including hate speech.70 The reserva-
tion to Article 20 clearly states that the ICCPR will not be allowed
to restrict our freedoms of speech and expression, as we have
defined them in such cases as R.A. V... The reservation generally
defines the United States approach, stating that our quasi-absolut-
'ist protection of free speech, even hate speech, will not be tainted
or limited by international norms, even though we pay lip service
to the ICCPR and the cause of international human rights. 72
The reservation eviscerates Article 20, at least as far as implement-
ing any direct domestic legislation.
Generally, international law contains few restrictions on reser-
vations. The major limits on reservations depend on the reactions
of other signing nations, and on the compatibility of the reserva-
tion with the object and purpose of the treaty and customary
international law in general. 73  Other countries have similarly re-
ble standard when it comes to criticizing the human rights performance of its allies, the
United States obviously is open to unanswerable charges of hypocrisy if it accuses others
of violating standards it refuses itself to accept." Id.
170 "Article 20 does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the Unit-
ed States that would restrict the right of free speech . . . protected by the Constitution
and laws of the United States." FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 166, at 6-7.
No reservation was made to Article 19(3), which also allows for free speech restric-
tions that would seem to go beyond those allowed in the United States. However, the
United States does not have to implement the full allowance of restrictions, and there-
fore nothing deemed unconstitutional is required in Article 19(3). Filvaroff et al., supra
note 152, at 118.
171 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). For a discussion of R.A.V., see supra Part III.C.2.
172 The broad reservations, declarations, and understandings adopted by the United
States "essentially declare that U.S. law and practice is perfect and the United States will
accept no international norm as an appropriate goal," which does "little credit either to
the U.S. concept of rights or to the international community." Hannum & Fischer, supra
note 169, at 283. See supra Part III.A-C (discussing United States "quasi-absolutist" protec-
tion of most expression, including hate speech under R.A.V.).
173 This is all based on the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, especially
Articles 19-21. See Coccia, supra note 156, at 7. Although not a party to the Convention.
the United States generally recognizes most of its provisions as binding custom in inter-
national law. Id. at 13. See generally id. at 22-34 (describing the application of the compat-
ibility rule to international treaty reservations generallyi.
Customary norms generally limit treaty derogation and reservations. jus cogens, or
peremptory norms, provide an absolute'limit much higher than general customary norms.
Id. at 31-33; see infra Part IV.E. (discussing more completely jus cogens limitations).
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served out of Article 20, and no countries have objected vigorously
to the reservations. 4  Objections generally are rare, in fact, and
"the compatibility rule does not apply when states accept reserva-
tions."" In addition, the compatibility rule is unclear and diffi-
cult to apply." 6 Thus, it is unlikely that the United States res-
ervation to Article 20 will be challenged or ruled incompatible
with the ICCPR; instead, it will remain valid under international
law.1
77
However, the non-self-executing declaration and the Article 20
reservation do not necessarily foreclose further inquiry into the ap-
plication of the ICCPR in the United States. Even the Senate has
expressed views not quite as hostile and permanent as the reserva-
tions and declarations suggest. The Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations extolled the virtues of "adhering to internationally recog-
nized standards of human rights," and stated that the approach of
the United States government "does not preclude the United
States from modifying its obligations under the Covenant in the
future if changes in U.S. law allow the United States to come into
full compliance."'78  Thus, the door is not fully closed to the
ICCPR; the United States could adhere to Article 20 and the
ICCPR more fully with genuine benefits both domestically and
internationally.'79  Additionally, by fully complying with the
ICCPR, especially as to the hate speech prohibitions of Article 20,
the United States can rid itself of the hypocrisy of its current
dichotomy of domestic and international postures.8 ' The United
States can better exercise its world leadership role in human
rights, and it can learn something from the rest of the world. 8 '
174 Dinah Shelton, International Law, in U.S. RATIFICATION, supra note 14, at 27, 32-33
(discussing the reservations of various nations to Article 20 of the ICCPR).
175 Coccia, supra note 156, at 34.
176 Id. at 22-23.
177 "In theory ... the only limit to the will of States as expressed in international
agreements is the doctrine of jus cogens, in -practice it is doubtful whether such will un-
dergoes any limit at all." Id. at 32-33 n.172. See infra Part IV.E.
178 FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 166, at 4, reprinted in 31 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 645 (1992).
179 See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 169, at 281; supra Parts II.B and III.D.2. (de-
scribing the harms of hate speech and the corresponding benefits of hate-speech regula-
tion).
180 See Hannum & Fischer, supra note 169, at 286.
181 tt. at 288-89.
Where U.S. policies are out of step with the rest of the world-and we may well
lag behind other Western democracies in the economic and social
spheres-international dialogue should result in more rights for Americans, not
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Specifically, the United States can learn to better protect all of its
citizens-speakers and listeners alike-by informing its free speech
jurisprudence with international considerations. But, how can this
be done in light of our treaty doctrine and the reservations to the
ICCPR?
E. Continued Relevance of Article 20
Even considering the United States' reservation to Article 20
of the ICCPR and the declaration that the ICCPR is non-self-exe-
cuting, the international approach to hate speech maintains a
certain domestic interpretive value.' Considering the confusion
and dissatisfaction of the United States courts with the constitu-
tional standards that apply to hate speech restrictions,83  the
reservation holds less weight than it first might seem. The reser-
vation states only that "Article 20 does not authorize or require
legislation or other action that would restrict the right of free
speech ... protected by the Constitution .. "'4 The reserva-
tion does not guarantee any specific free speech principle, and
may actually require a "rereading of the first Amendment or at
least .,. . a reading that is not 'absolutist' free speech."' " Ad-
fewer .... The United States can stand by, aloof and proud, or it can exercise
the leadership role its 200-year history of democracy justifies, by accepting that
human rights norms are truly universal and worthy of support.
Id. See also Weissbrodt, supra note 167, at 261 (describing the merits of studying interna-
tional human rights and constitutional law to benefit the study and application of con-
stitutional law in the United States).
182 See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court as the
ultimate interpreter and arbiter of the Constitution, treaties, and laws of the United
States). This notion of the Court as interpreter was recognized by the Senate: "Nothing
in [the ICCPR] requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United States
of America prohibited by the Constitution ... as interpreted by the United States." FOREIGN
RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 166, at 24 (emphasis added).
183 See supra Part III.D. (discussing the split of opinions in R.A.V. and the distaste
which the various Justices felt in deciding for the hate-speaker).
184 FOREIGN RELATIONS REPORT, supra note 166, at 6-7.
185 Jordan J. Paust, Rereading the First Amendment in Light of Treaties Proscribing Incite-
ment to Racial Discrimination or Hostility, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 565, 567-69 (1991). While
Professor Paust refers specifically to a different treaty, the language of the proposed Unit-
ed States reservation to that treaty, substantially similar to the reservation to Article 20 of
the ICCPR, states that nothing in the treaty can "require or authorize" any action by the
United States government. Ld. at 566-67. Professor Paust writes:
[T]he language of the reservation does not expressly guarantee the primacy of
an "absolutist" free speech principle. In fact, no particular free speech principle,
value, or content is necessarily protected by such language . . . . [Gliven the
normal rule of construction that one should interpret domestic law consistently
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ditionally, the right protected by the Constitution, here the right
to freedom of speech, including hate speech, remains unclear
under the Court's split in R.A. V. Thus, it is not so obvious that
Article 20 would directly conflict with our rights under the Consti-
tution.
More importantly, by using international norms to interpret
domestic rights and laws, the United States courts would not be
using Article 20 as "authorization" for a change in its hate speech
approach. Instead, the United States courts could use their inter-
pretive powers and international law to incorporate the customary
norms defined by Article 20. ' "As a principle of interpretation,
domestic law is construed as fully as possible in conformity with
the international law."" 7 Generally, treaty provisions evidence
customary norms of international law such that they become uni-
versally binding on all nations, including non-signing nations."
Many have argued that human rights standards, and specifically
the standards in the ICCPR, are indeed such customary norms. 9
In fact, many go further, holding such human rights principles to
be "peremptory" norms, or jus cogens, and therefore non-derogable
and unalterable, disallowing any reservation. 9
The United States has demonstrated that it too holds interna-
tional human rights standards to be overriding in their importance
and influence. 9 Historically, international norms and treaties
were of paramount significance to the Framers of the Constitution,
and under their natural law ideals they advocated the incorpora-
tion of such fundamental principles into domestic law as binding
precedent.'92  While the relative willingness of United States
with our international obligations, one can appreciate that the reservation's lan-
guage is not merely content-neutral and potentially protective of constitutional
requirements that are contrary to those of the treaty, but also presumptively
supportive of the obligations set forth in the treaty.
Id. at 567-69 (footnotes omitted).
186 See supra note 5 (defining the Court's interpretive power).
187 Shelton, supra note 174, at 277.
188 Strossen, supra note 133, at 816. Such things as the general usage of nations.
judicial decisions, resolutions of international bodies, and national legislation also evi-
dence such customary norms. See also Coccia, supra note 156, at 30-34.
189 Strossen, supra note 133, at 816-17. In fact, the United States government holds
the ICCPR to be at least a customary law principle. Id. at 818.
190 Id. at 816-17. "[T]hese standards cannot be changed by agreement . . . . [T]he
International Court of Justice has declared that rules concerning the basic human rights
are 'obligations erga mnnes" (owing by each state to all persons)." Id.
191 Id. at 818.
192 Id. at 818-23.
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courts to incorporate international norms into domestic law has
gone through several cycles, there is little doubt that, in proper
situations, such norms may be employed as interpretive tools.
93
Thus, the use of international norms, such as those evidenced by
the ICCPR, as interpretive principles in domestic law would com-
port with the Framer's intent and with judicial practice and prece-
dent. 4 The ICCPR "can [and should] be used by state and fed-
eral courts to interpret or clarify constitutional or legislative stan-
dards."'95 In cases where domestic laws are unclear and open to
definitional argument, the ICCPR, as a customary norm of interna-
tional human rights law, should be used to inform the United
States courts' determinations of the meaning and application of
those laws.
193 See Shelton. supra note 174, at 277 & n.14; Strossen, supra note 133, at 820-23,
831-36. The United States Supreme Court has regularly employed international norms to
interpret the Constitution and our domestic laws. See, e.g., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S.
361, 369 & n.1 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 & n.31 (1988) ("We
have previously recognized the relevance of the views of the international community ..
. ."); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982). While these are generally Eighth
Amendment death penalty cases, there are cases dealing with other constitutional issues,
such as Fourteenth Amendment equal protection. See Strossen, supra note 133, at 834.
Most importantly, such cases demonstrate the Court's willingness to incorporate
international norms into domestic decisions. In Stanford, Justice Brennan actually referred
directly to the ICCPR as a source for interpreting a domestic constitutional issue. See 492
U.S. at 390 & n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The lower federal courts and many state courts have also relied on international
norms to help interpret domestic law. Specifically, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876
(2d Cir. 1980) (demonstrating' the incorporationist approach to the use of customary
international law domestically), as well as the many recent federal and state cases evinc-
ing a similar willingness to use the interpretive approach. See Strossen, supra note 133, at
822-23 & nn.79-83.
194 See generally Shelton, supra note 174, at 277; Strossen, supra note 133, at 827-28,
831-36.
In contrast to U.S. courts' current reluctance to view themselves as bound di-
rectly to international human rights principles on substantive issues, they are
much more willing to invoke such principles-whether embodied in treaties or
in other manifestations of customary international law-to guide the interpre-
tation of domestic legal norms .... Even apostles of positivism concede that
judges should be free to resolve ambiguities, or to fill gaps, in positive law by
reference to universally accepted legal principles . . . . The resort to interna-
tional human rights standards for purposes of construing domestic statutes and
constitutions is fully consistent with, and justified by: ... the intent of the fram-
ers of the U.S. Constitution; the early practice of U.S. courts and other govern-
ment officials; .. . and the consistent practice of federal and state courts
throughout the U.S.
Id. at 824-25 (footnotes omitted).
195 Shelton, supra note 174, at 277.
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Thus, the international approach to hate speech can be in-
corporated as a customary norm into our First Amendment juris-
prudence. The international approach to limiting hate speech
would not usurp our strong protection of free speech, but rather
would supplement our approach with due consideration for the
rights of the listener-the unprotected victim under current Unit-
ed States law. 96 It requires a refocusing of the balancing process
in the international manner towards antidiscrimination and equali-
ty,19 while maintaining the high stature of free speech.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is
broad in its language, as is Article 20 of the ICCPR.195 Thus,
even though the new approach, using both free speech protection
and hate speech regulation, is applicable and beneficial to our
society, a major problem remains-how can such broad principles
be implemented in the United States without promoting judicial
or government censorship?
V. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
A solution to the problem of hate speech requires recognition
of the importance of freedom of expression, and at the same time
condemnation of hate speech as inconsistent with community
living and proper respect for human dignity. The conclusion de-
rived from the above comparison of approaches is that the balanc-
ing approach, utilizing the positive aspects of both the United
States and international systems, must be incorporated into our
free speech jurisprudence.'99 It can, and will, better protect the
rights of all members of society. Specifically, the rights of the
speaker and the listener must be equally recognized and protect-
ed.2"' Such equal protection can only be realized by closely ex-
amining and balancing the actions, reactions, and rights of both
sides of the hate speech confrontation."'
196 See supra Parts II.B and III.D (describing the failure of United States courts to
consider victims' rights).
197 See supra notes 128-29 (defining the international focus on antidiscrimination and
equality).
198 See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (quoting the First Amendment and
ICCPR, art. 20).
199 As shown in Part IV.E., the international balancing approach under the ICCPR
can be incorporated into United States courts as an interpretive tool.
200 See supra Part II.B. and III.D.1 (presenting arguments for recognizing the rights
and needs of the listener).
201 Justice Stevens described his dissatisfaction with the overbroad sweep of the
Court's "categorical approach" to the First Amendment, as it "fits poorly with the com-
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The United States can be seen as an advocate for absolutist
protection of almost all speech, and specifically hate speech."2
The ICCPR, while not advocating absolute protection of any one
right, can be seen as an advocate for hate speech prohibition."'
As in the ideal adversarial trial, the opposing advocates present
the extremes, and somewhere between them lies the truth, or
here, the solution to the hate speech dilemma.
The middle ground, where the balancing. approach can best
be used, rests in the overlap of the exceptions to the United
States absolutist approach-"fighting words" and incitement to
illegal conduct-and the "incitement" concept of Article 20 of the
.ICCPR.2°  Both speak to "incitement," whether it be incitement
to violence, hostility, or discrimination.0" Incitement to any of
these is detrimental to society and public order, and thus each
should be uniformly condemned.216  "Fighting words" doctrine
plex reality of expression," and ultimately "sacrifices subtlety for clarity." R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2566 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). "I believe our decisions es-
tablish a more complex and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context
of the regulated speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech." Id. at
2567.
202 See supra Part III.A-C (describing the United States approach to hate speech).
203 See supra Part IV.A-B (recounting the international approach to hate speech as
derived from Article 20 of the ICCPR).
204 The "fighting words" doctrine was first articulated in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). It stands for the proposition that face-to-face words that
"have a tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the re-
mark is addressed," where a reasonable man of "common intelligence" is the listener, can
be banned constitutionally without infringing on the speaker's right to free speech. Id. at
573. "Fighting words" are considered to be unprotected speech. There is some overlap
here with Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg defines another excep-
tion to general free-speech protection-incitement to illegal conduct. "(A]dvocacy of the
use of force or of law violation" can only be prohibited or limited "where such advocacy
is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action." Id. at 447.
Article 20 requires prohibition of "advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to hostility, discrimination or violence .... " ICCPR, supra
note 1, art. 20(2), reprinted in BOSStrtr, at 403.
205 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (comparing Article 20's incitement
provisions to the United States approach to incitement as defined by Brandenburg).
Chaplinsky, similar to Brandenburg, defines the unprotected speech-"fighting words"
here-as words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace . . . ." 315 U.S. at 572 (emphasis added).
206 "'[A]dvocating' violent means to effect political and economic change involves
such danger to the security of the State that the State may outlaw it." Brandenburg, 395
U.S. at 447 (stating the reasoning of Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), as dis-
credited for its overbroad limit on protected speech, but not overruling this statement as
the basic reason for creating an exception to free-speech protection).
Justice Murphy stated in dictum tha.t "fighting words" have only "slight social value
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looks to the reaction of a listener to a face-to-face attack," 7 while
Article 20 provides an individual the right not to be confronted
with hate speech. The focus is on the reactions of listen-
ers-victims and bystanders. Thus, the listener is explicitly includ-
ed in the balancing of rights by both approaches. This common
ground of considering listener reaction, then, provides the basis
for informing the overall protection of free speech with a respect
for the rights of hate speech victims. It is here that the interna-
tional balancing approach can be incorporated into United States
jurisprudence as an interpretive tool0. for the definition and
evolution of "fighting words."
By maintaining our general free speech protection, while spe-
cifically looking to "fighting words" and Article 20 jurisprudence
for guidance on hate speech victim protection, several factors..9
may be distilled out of the process. These factors can then be
used in a narrow balancing test for defining proscribable hate
speech. Once it is shown that hate speech is indeed involved-a
showing that speech advocating or inciting hatred, violence or
discrimination based on race, nationality, religion, gender, or eth-
nicity has in fact been uttered2 10 -the factors should include:
as a step to truth . . . [which] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
"There was general agreement that advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
and war propaganda were evils." BoSSu,'r, supra note 1, at 406 (quoting the Commission
of Human Rights' discussion and debate of Article 20 of the ICCPR).
207 The Court described the prohibited speech in Chaplinsky as "epithets likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation. ... 315 U.S. at 770. This demonstrates that
the focus is on the reaction of at least the "average" listener.
208 See supra Part IV.E (defining the interpretive powers of the courts in the incor-
poration of international law into domestic use).
209 Kent Greenawalt suggests three such factors in his book, namely, "aims of the
speaker, damage to the listener, the nature of the language used, or some combination
of these three . . . ." KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE
296-97 (1989). See also Cass 1R Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE
LJ. 589, 602-05 (describing factors defining "low-value" speech as suggested by judicial
decisions). My factors were partly inspired by Greenawalt's and Professor Sunstein's sug-
gestions, but in a much stronger sense, it was the clash between the needs of the victim
and a fear of censorship that really defined my thought processes in this endeavor.
210 This threshhold "definition" is based on the language of Article 20 of the ICCPR.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text. Another plausible "definition" is offered by Pro-
fessor Matsuda: "In order to distinguish the worst, paradigm example of racist hate mes-
sages from other forms of racist and nonracist speech, three identifying characteristics are
suggested: 1. The message is of racial inferiority; 2. The message is directed against a
historically oppressed group; and 3. The message is persecutorial, hateful, and degrading."
Matsuda, supra note 6, at 2357. Both "definitions" have something positive to offer. Pro-
fessor Matsuda is dealing more narrowly with race, but these factors can most likely be
extrapolated to cover ethnicity, religion, etc.
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(1) the intent of the speaker;
(2) how closely the speech was directed at a specific person or
group, at the time of its utterance;
(3) the response actually induced in the listener;
(4) the government's interest in protecting the speech;21' and
(5) whether there is any other reasonable use or purpose of
the speech for which it should be protected.212
The balance of these factors will define the outcome. The interests
of the listener, the speaker, society, and the state are all balanced
on the scale of justice in the context of the hate speech confron-
tation. The freedom and dignity of both listener and speaker must
be equally protected.
These factors, whether it be intent or the interests involved,
have been developed in various areas of United States jurispru-
dence.213 They collectively entail a generous respect for the
speaker's right to speak, as seen in the consideration of the inter-
ests for protection, as well as the listener's right not to be con-
fronted with hate speech. The jurisprudence of other signatory
nations to the ICCPR-especially Canada214  and Germany" -in
I placed the word "definition" in quotes here, because these merely serve as
parameters which allow us to know whether we are dealing with a hate speech issue. The
real definition of whether a certain act is legally proscribable hate speech is based on
the balancing of the factors set out below.
211 "Government interest" is defined, for instance, in First Amendment cases involving
content-based regulations on speech in public fora, such as Perry Educational Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), and cases following in that line. See
generally NoWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 1090-99 (citing various cases under the
Peny analysis which demonstrate the case law development of government interests in
speech limitation).
212 This factor is formulated in a parallel sense to the third, prong of the current ob-
scenity test, which requires consideration of "whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). "The test is whether a reasonable person (not an ordinary member of any given
community) would find value in the material taken as a whole." NOWAK & ROTUNDA.
supra note 8, at 1144 (citing Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 501 & n.3 (1987)). This line
of cases, although based on obscenity, should at least provide an analog of how this fac-
tor should be developed for hate speech.
213 See supra notes 210-12.
214 See, e.g., The Queen v. Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697 (Can. 1990). Keegstra is the seminal
Canadian, and possibly international, case on hate speech which demonstrates many, if
not all, of the arguments for the international balancing approach, based on listeners'
and speakers' rights, and diguitarian, equalitarian principles. It is a good example of how
hate speech should be regulated, although its reasoning cannot be directly brought into
the United States, as the international principles of the ICCPR are expressed directly in
their constitutional documents. See generally Irwin Cotfer, Principles and Perspectives on Hate
Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-discrimination: The Canadian Experience as a Case-Study
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adjudicating Article 20 matters also informs the elements of the
test.21  The critical element that is added to the current inade-
quate United States approach to hate speech regulation, as depict-
ed in R.A.V., is proper consideration for the victim-listener's reaction and
rights.217 Respect for the basic dignity and rights of all human be-
ings is the indispensable factor.
The balance of these factors weighed together in good faith,
with general free speech protections still in place,1 8 should suffi-
ciently protect our freedom of speech, especially in light of our
rightly continued general disdain for limitations on speech. Re-
gardless of the specific test that is developed to deal with the hate
speech problem, though, it is of the utmost importance that the
United States accept the international balancing of rights as a
modification of our unreasonable absolutist approach. Ultimately,
this must be the beginning of any solution to the hate speech
problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The belief that "all Men are created equal" is a basic tenet of
one of our most cherished and fundamental documents, the Dec-
in Striking a Balance, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 123; Manwaring, supra note
145, at 106.
215 See, e.g., The Mephisto Case. 30 BVerfGE 173 (Ger. 1971); The Luth Case, 7
BVerfGE 198 (Ger. 1958). These cases exemplify the German approach to speech limita-
tion. These are not hate-speech cases per se, but their principles apply to hate speech, as
the balancing approach was demonstrated there with a heavy thrust towards dignitarian
ideals and individual honor. See generally Rainer Hofmann, Incitement to National and Racial
Hatred: the Legal Situation in Germany, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 159; DON-
ALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MtANY 366 (1989).
216 See Part III: County Experiences, in STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 6, at 75 (de-
scribing the laws and experiences of various countries around the world; most important-
ly, because they have democracies relatively similar to the United States. several articles
from Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Australia are included).
217 The response of the listener, under factor (3) of the above test, should be limit-
ed in its weight by a threshhold "reasonableness" standard. To allow the oversensitive
listener to go to court everytime they are unintentionally slighted would chill free speech
by placing the rest of the community in fear of mistakenly uttering an "insult." Knowing-
ly attacking a person's sensitivity is different, and should be weighed against the speaker
under factor (1)-the intent factor. The balancing of the various factors of the test
should filter out the frivolous and oversensitive without turning away those with genuine
injuries.
218 The overbreadth and void-for-vagueness doctrines comprise the two main "general
free-speech protections." See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 8, at 944-52 (defin-
ing overbreadth and vagueness).
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laration of Independence."9 Equality cannot abide weighing the
right of one person more heavily than the right of another. The
First Amendment must not continue to protect the dangerous and
harmful hate speech of racists and bigots at the expense of silenc-
ing and subordinating the voices and rights of minorities. The
inordinate protection of such worthless speech is a "quixotic tilt at
wind mills which belittles great principles of liberty."220 It is time
that the United States recognizes the rights of the speaker and the
listener. It is time that the United States fully accept its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights-joining the international community in protecting the
rights of all by balancing the competing and equal rights of each.
Scott J. Catlin
219 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). ,
220 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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